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India, China ships compete in Indian Ocean
8/ 17 June 2008, Chicago Tribune,

 

Hambantota, a battered harbor town on Sri Lanka's southern tip, seems an unlikely focus for an emerging international competition over energy supply routes that fuel much of the global economy. An impoverished place still recovering from the devastation of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Hambantota has a desolate air, a sense of nowhereness, punctuated by the realization that looking south over the expanse of ocean, the next landfall is Antarctica.

 

But just over the horizon runs one of the world's great trade arteries, the shipping lanes where thousands of vessels carry oil from the Middle East and raw materials to Asia, returning with television sets, toys and sneakers for European consumers. These tankers provide 80 percent of China's oil and 65 percent of India's -- fuel desperately needed for the two countries' rapidly growing economies. Japan, too, is almost totally dependent on energy supplies shipped through the Indian Ocean. Any disruption -- from terrorism, piracy, natural disaster or war -- could have devastating effects on these countries and, in an increasingly interdependent world, send ripples across the globe. When an unidentified ship attacked a Japanese oil tanker traveling through the Indian Ocean from South Korea to Saudi Arabia in April, the news sent oil prices to record highs.

 

For decades the world relied on the powerful U.S. Navy to protect this vital sea lane. But as India and China gain economic heft, they are moving to expand their control of the waterway, sparking a new -- and potentially dangerous -- rivalry between Asia's emerging giants.

 

Ties between India and China _ which together have one-third of the world's population _ are at their closest since a brief China-India 1962 border war. Last year, trade between India and China grew to $37 billion and their two armies conducted their first joint military exercise. However, the two nations remain sharply divided over territorial claims dating back to the war. China claims India's northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh and occupies a chunk of territory in Kashmir that Indian regards as its own.

 

China has given massive aid to Indian Ocean nations, signing friendship pacts, building ports in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and reportedly setting up a listening post on one of Myanmar's islands near the strategic Strait of Malacca.

 

Among China's latest moves is the billion dollar Hambantota port its engineers are building in Sri Lanka, an island country just off India's southern coast. The Chinese insist the Hambantota port is a purely commercial move, and by all appearances, it is. But some in India see ominous designs behind the project. "We cannot take them at face value. We cannot assume their intentions are benign," said B. Raman, a hawkish, retired Indian intelligence official. A 2004 Pentagon report called Beijing's effort to expand its presence in the region China's "string of pearls."

 

"It is a pincer movement," said Rahul Bedi, a South Asia analyst with London-based Jane's Defense Weekly. "That, together with the slap India got in 1962, keeps them awake at night."

 

Now, India is trying to parry China's moves. It beat out China for a port project in Myanmar. India has set up listening stations in Mozambique and Madagascar, in part to monitor Chinese movements, Bedi noted. It also has an air base in Kazakhstan and a space monitoring post in Mongolia -- both China's neighbors. And, flush with cash from its expanding economy, India is beefing up its military, with the expansion seemingly aimed at China. Washington and, to a lesser extent, Tokyo are encouraging India's role as a counterweight to growing Chinese power.

 

India's 2007 defense budget was about $21.7 billion, up 7.8 percent from 2006. China said its 2008 military budget would jump 17.6 percent to some $59 billion, following a similar increase last year. The U.S. estimates China's actual defense spending may be much higher. India has announced plans to have aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines at sea in the next decade and recently tested nuclear-capable missiles that put China's major cities well in range. Like India, China is focusing heavily on its navy, building an increasingly sophisticated submarine fleet that could eventually be one of the world's largest.

 

India said that it needs a military space program to defend its satellites from threats like China's newly revealed ability to shoot down targets in orbit. The comments by India's army chief raise the possibility of a regional race that could accelerate the militarization of space and heighten tensions between the Asian giants, who have been enjoying their warmest ties in decades. China destroyed one of its own defunct weather satellites with a ballistic missile in January, becoming the third country, after Russia and the U.S., to shoot down an object in orbit.

 

The Indian military does not have its own dedicated spy satellites and uses civilian ones to gather imagery and other intelligence. India has an advanced civilian space program and frequently launches both types of satellites for other countries, including an Israeli spy satellite in January.  Other Indian generals said a military space race was almost certain. "In a life-and-death scenario, space will provide the advantage," said Lt. Gen. H.S. Lidder, who heads the Indian military department that deals with space technology.

 

Encouraging India's role as a counter to China, the U.S. has stepped up exercises with the Indian navy and last year sold it an American warship for the first time, the 17,000-ton amphibious transport dock USS Trenton. American defense contractors -- shut out from the lucrative Indian market during the long Cold War -- have been offering India's military everything from advanced fighter jets to anti-ship missiles. "It is in our interest to develop this relationship," U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said during a visit to New Delhi in February. "Just as it is in the Indians' interest"

 

Officially, China says it's not worried about India's military buildup or its closer ties with the U.S. However, foreign analysts believe China is deeply concerned by the possibility of a U.S.-Indian military alliance. Ian Storey of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore said China sent strong diplomatic messages expressing opposition to a massive naval exercise India held last year with the U.S., Japan, Singapore and Australia. And Bedi, the Jane's analyst, added "those exercises rattled the Chinese."

 


RIVALS - Is a collision among China, India and Japan inevitable?
29 June 2008, Washington Post, By Bill Emmott/ Nayan Chanda

 

Asia's re-emergence has been a long time coming. Before the industrial revolution, India and China accounted for nearly half of the world's output of manufactured goods. After a long hiatus scarred by colonial rule, two bloody world wars, civil strife and revolutionary upheavals, the continent began its painful crawl back to the forefront of the world economy. Japan had already emerged from the ashes of war to become a leading economic power by the 1980s, at which point Deng Xiaoping set China on its amazing trajectory. In 1991, with national bankruptcy looming, India also undertook free-market reforms.

 

Numerous books, from William H. Overholt's The Rise of China (1993) to Peter Engardio's Chindia: How China and India are Revolutionizing Global Business (2006), have expressed breathless enthusiasm over Asia's rising powers. Yet others, such as Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro's The Coming Conflict with China (1997), have foreseen disasters just around the corner, from regional conflict to environmental catastrophe to war with the United States. In Rivals, Bill Emmott splits the difference, offering a sober, nuanced assessment of the opportunities and dangers that Asia's rise presents. But because so much writing about Asia is either celebratory or alarmist, this cautious, hedging, not-sure-how-it-will-turn-out book is refreshing.

 

Emmott, a former Tokyo correspondent and editor of the Economist, starts by noting an important U.S. foreign policy achievement that has been overlooked in the general dismay over the war in Iraq. He credits the Bush administration for spotting the shifting regional balance produced by China's phenomenal economic growth and for embracing India as a counterweight. Though lacking the drama of Nixon's 1972 visit to China, the (yet to be implemented) U.S.-India nuclear agreement, he says, was "an act of grand strategic importance."

 

Emmott proceeds to explore the dynamics of economic and demographic change in China, Japan and India. In his view, ancient rivalries and mutual suspicions among the Asian powers, aggravated by their expanding populations, could spoil the happy march toward prosperity. Although Asia may not be in a full-fledged arms race, he says, it is certainly in a "strategic-insurance-policy race," in which China's military spending has been rising 18 percent a year and India's has been going up 8 percent. "It will be quite a surprise if China does not have aircraft carriers by 2020 or so," he notes, "and India has already announced that it will have at least three."

 

Japan, too, would be building up its military insurance policy if it did not have constitutional constraints on its armed forces and a close military alliance with the United States. But "the main problem in Asia," Emmott concludes, "is fear and suspicion of China. It is not going to go away." So what should be done to avoid conflict?

 

Emmott offers a series of recommendations for the United States, the European Union and the rising Asian powers, some of which may strike readers as worthy goals that have little practical chance of attainment. He says, the United States and the European Union should urgently "scrap or reform all the top organizations of global governance in which China, India and Japan are not properly and fully represented," including the Group of Eight leading industrial countries, the U.N. Security Council, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Japan, with help from its former enemies, should leave behind its bitter history and acknowledge its wartime atrocities. India should rise above its suspicion of its neighbors and develop cooperative relations. China's "main weakness is its authoritarian, unaccountable and sometimes brutal political system," he says, "but it would waste space to recommend that that system be changed." Instead, Emmott urges Beijing to be more transparent about its decisions because "by keeping so much secret . . . China encourages other countries to believe it has a lot to hide."

 

Emblematic of the fine balance of this book is Emmott's observation that armed conflict among Asia's rivals is "not inevitable but nor is it inconceivable." Sketching a "plausibly pessimistic" scenario, he suggests that an economic downturn and popular discontent could lead the Chinese Communist Party to wrap itself in the flag of nationalism and slide into conflict with neighbors over Taiwan, the Korean peninsula, Tibet or Pakistan. But he thinks there is also reason for "credible optimism." With encouragement from the rest of the world, the Asian powers could lift millions more people out of poverty with their dynamism, innovation and faith in a unifying religion: money.

 

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